Conventional versions of the Phillips curve cannot account for in ‡ation dynamics during and after the U.S. Great Recession, leading many to conclude that the Phillips curve relationship has weakened or even disappeared. We show that if agents solve a signal extraction problem to disentangle temporary versus permanent shocks to in ‡ation, then agents'in ‡ation expectations should have become more "anchored"over the Great Moderation period. An estimated New Keynesian Phillips curve that accounts for the increased anchoring of expected in ‡ation exhibits a stable slope coe¢ cient over the period 1960 to 2019. Out-of-sample forecasts show that this model can account for the "missing disin ‡ation"during the U.S. Great Recession and the "missing in ‡ation"during the subsequent recovery. We use a simple three-equation New Keynesian model to show that an increase in the Taylor rule coe¢ cient on in ‡ation (or the output gap) serves to endogenously anchor agents'subjective in ‡ation expectations and thereby " ‡atten"the reduced-form Phillips curve.
Introduction
Starting with the seminal contributions of Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) , the expectationsaugmented Phillips curve, which links in ‡ation to expected in ‡ation and some measure of economic activity, has become a key element in monetary economic models. But over the past decade, in ‡ation in the U.S. appears to have deviated from the behavior predicted by the Phillips curve. First, the absence of a persistent decline in in ‡ation during the Great Recession (the "missing disin ‡ation," Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015a) , and, subsequently, the absence of re-in ‡ation during the recovery (the "missing in ‡ation, "Constâncio, 2015) , has led some to argue that the Phillips curve relationship has weakened or even disappeared (Hall 2011 , Powell 2019 . Indeed, Hall and Sargent (2018) percentage points. From a historical perspective, a recession of this magnitude should have delivered substantial disin ‡ationary pressures. But in the wake of the Great Recession, core CPI in ‡ation declined by less than 2 percentage points. Moreover, core CPI in ‡ation sharply increased from 2010 and 2012 while the CBO output gap remained in negative territory. The absence of a large disin ‡ation has become known as "the missing disin ‡ation puzzle." Figure   1 shows that long-run in ‡ation expectations, as measured by 10-year ahead CPI in ‡ation forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the Livingston Survey, remained nearly constant during the Great Recession. More recently, however, long-run in ‡ation expectations have gradually declined and are currently hovering about 25 basis points (bp) below their pre-recession levels. Similarly, core CPI in ‡ation has remained about 50 bp below its pre-recession level. The Fed's preferred in ‡ation measure, namely the headline PCE in ‡ation rate, has remained mostly below the Fed's 2% target since 2012. The absence of re-in ‡ation during the recovery from the Great Recession has become known as the "missing in ‡ation puzzle." These in ‡ation puzzles have led some to conclude that the historically observed statistical relationship between economic slack and in ‡ation, i.e., the Phillips curve, has changed. Figure   2 provides reduced-form evidence that the Phillips curve has become " ‡atter" over time.
The …gure plots the CBO output gap against the 4-quarter change in the 4-quarter core CPI in ‡ation rate, both before and after the millennium. Indeed, in ‡ation appears to have become less sensitive to economic slack over the past 20 years compared to the previous 40 year period. Numerous empirical studies attribute this …nding, at least partially, to a decline in the structural slope parameter of the Phillips curve (Ball and Mazumder 2011 , IMF 2013 , Blanchard, Cerutti and Summers 2015 . 1 In an in ‡uential speech, Bernanke (2007) points out that the "anchoring" of agents'in‡ation expectations would make reduced-form versions of the Phillips curve appear ‡atter.
Intuitively, if agents set prices and wages with reference to their long-run in ‡ation expectations, and if these expectations become insensitive to changes in economic activity, then in ‡ation itself will become less sensitive to economic activity. Most economists would agree that in ‡ation expectations are well-anchored, and that this anchoring served to mute disin ‡ationary pressures during the Great Recession (Williams 2009 , Stock and Watson, 2010 , Blanchard, et al. 2015 . Nevertheless, the term "anchored"remains somewhat loosely-de…ned in the literature. Few papers have attempted to formalize the idea in the context of a theoretical equilibrium model or in the empirical estimation of the Phillips curve. Consequently, it remains unclear to what extent expectations are anchored, why expectations have become more anchored over time and, importantly, how this anchoring a¤ects the quantitative relationship between in ‡ation and economic slack.
In this paper, we postulate that agents have an imperfect understanding of the in ‡ation process but nevertheless behave in a boundedly-rational manner. Along the lines of Stock and Watson (2007, 2010) , agents construct their in ‡ation forecasts using a univariate timeseries model for in ‡ation which allows for both temporary and permanent shocks.
2 This approach has several appealing properties. First, it allows for a straightforward interpretation of the concept of "anchored"expectations. In our model, the representative agent's subjective in ‡ation forecast, e E t t+1 , is determined by the Kalman …lter: e E t t+1 = e E t 1 t + ( t e E t 1 t ); where 2 (0; 1] is the Kalman gain that governs the sensitivity of in ‡ation expectations to short-run in ‡ation surprises. A low value of implies that agents do not revise their in ‡ation forecasts much in response to in ‡ation surprises, implying that expectations are 1 A Phillips curve slope parameter which depends positively on the level (or volatility) of in ‡ation can be motivated by theories of costly price adjustment (Ball, Mankiw, and Romer 1988) . Lansing (2019a) presents some empirical evidence in support of this idea.
2 But in contrast to Stock and Watson (2007, 2010) , agents in our model abstract from stochastic volatility in the two types of shocks.
well-anchored. This idea seems to capture the de…nition provided by Bernanke (2007) : "I use the term "anchored" to mean relatively insensitive to incoming data. So, for example, if the public experiences a spell of in ‡ation higher than their long-run expectation, but their long-run expectation of in ‡ation changes little as a result, then in ‡ation expectations are well anchored." Second, this type of forecast rule is strongly supported by survey data on actual expectations, including in ‡ation expectations, as measured by the Survey of Professional Forecasters (Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2015b) . Third, as pointed out by Stock and Watson (2010) , deriving in ‡ation forecasts from a univariate time series model may be viewed as "near rational"given that numerous studies show that in ‡ation is well-described by univariate statistical processes (Stock and Watson 2007 , Lansing 2009 , Kozicki and Tinsley 2012 , Clark and Doh 2014 , Cecchetti, et al. 2017 , Dotsey, et. al. 2018 ).
Our approach has several important implications. First, in line with Bernanke's hypothesis, we …nd that in ‡ation expectations have become increasingly anchored since the early1980s, as re ‡ected by a lower estimated value of . Second, holding the structural slope parameter of the Phillips curve constant, we show that a lower value of implies that in ‡a-tion becomes less sensitive to variations in economic slack. 3 Thus, the anchoring of in ‡ation expectations can help explain the observed ‡attening of the reduced-form Phillips curve. Indeed, by allowing for time variation in ; an estimated version of a New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) exhibits a stable and highly statistically signi…cant slope parameter over the period 1960 to 2019. To our knowledge, our paper is the …rst to document a stable and signi…cant NKPC relationship in U.S. data over the past 60 years.
We use our estimated NKPC to generate out-of-sample forecasts for the Great Recession period. The exercise shows that the estimated NKPC accounts very well for the behavior of in ‡ation and long run in ‡ation expectations over the period 2007 to 2019. We …nd that in ‡ation expectations were well-anchored (but not perfectly anchored) prior to the outbreak of the Great Recession. Well-anchored in ‡ation expectations imply a muted response of in ‡ation to a highly-negative output gap. However, a long-lasting negative gap episode gradually induces a moderate but persistent decline in long-run in ‡ation expectations. As a result, in ‡ation persistently undershoots the Fed's target in ‡ation rate. According to our model of the NKPC, there is no missing disin ‡ation puzzle in the wake of the Great Recession and no missing in ‡ation puzzle during the subsequent recovery. in ‡ation and economic slack remains alive and well. According to our model, the apparent ‡attening of the reduced-form Phillips curve over time can be driven by an increase in the monetary policy response to in ‡ation (or the output gap) which, in turn, serves to anchor agents'in ‡ation expectations. 4 We assume an analogous speci…cation for output gap expectations. 1960-1999 2000-2019 Note: The …gure plots …tted lines of the form: 4;t 4;t 4 = c 0 + c 1 y t ; where 4;t is the 4-quarter core CPI in ‡ation rate and y t is the CBO output gap.
Related Literature
The in ‡ation puzzles have spurred a large literature exploring potential explanations. Daly, et al. 2012 and Hobijn 2014 argue that downward nominal wage rigidity can prevent wages (and prices) from declining substantially during a recession. In contrast, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015a) …nd no evidence of missing disin ‡ation in wages during the Great Recession. Instead, these authors argue that the missing disin ‡ation is explained by a sharp rise in household in ‡ation expectations between 2009 and 2011 which, in turn, can be traced to higher oil prices. Del Negro, et al. (2015) …nd that the presence of …nancial frictions can help explain the missing disin ‡ation by reducing the estimated slope of the NKPC. Christiano, et al. (2015) show that a decline in productivity growth combined with an increase in the cost of working capital can help account for the small observed drop in in ‡ation during the Great Recession.
According to Lindé and Trabandt (2019) , the introduction of additional strategic complementarities in price and wage setting can resolve both in ‡ation puzzles in a nonlinear solution of the New Keynesian model. The nonlinear solution delivers ‡atter price and wage Phillips curves when the output gap is negative.
Accounts of the missing in ‡ation puzzle often invoke the role played by the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates. Hills, Nakata, and Schmidt (2016) show that the risk of encountering the ZLB in the future can shift agents'expectations such that the central bank undershoots its in ‡ation target in the present. Bianchi, et al. (2019) make a similar point.
Lansing (2019b) considers a New Keynesian model with an occasionally binding ZLB and two local rational expectations equilibria, labeled the "targeted" and "de ‡ation" solutions respectively. The model can produce persistent in ‡ation undershooting if agents' forecast rules assign a nontrivial weight to the de ‡ation equilibrium.
While the above-mentioned theories o¤er some important insights about in ‡ation dynamics, our paper presents a simple model that can account for key features of U.S. in ‡ation data over the past 40 years. As emphasized by Miskin (2007) : " [W] hat is particularly attractive about highlighting a better anchoring of in ‡ation expectations as probably the primary factor driving the changes in in ‡ation dynamics is that this one explanation covers so many of the stylized facts-an application of Occam's razor."
Our theoretical framework is related to Lansing (2009) and Carvalho, et al. (2019) who develop partial equilibrium models in which the concept of central bank credibility or anchored in ‡ation expectations is linked to agents' signal extraction problem for unobserved trend in ‡ation. To our knowledge, our paper is the …rst to formalize the link between the degree of anchoring in agents'in ‡ation expectations and the coe¢ cients of the monetary policy rule in a general equilibrium model.
The empirical approach in our paper is closely related to Stock and Watson (2010) and Stock (2011) . These authors derive a measure of expected in ‡ation from the unobserved components-stochastic volatility (UC-SV) model of Stock and Watson (2007) . They …nd support for a stable slope coe¢ cient in reduced-form Phillips curve regressions using the socalled "unemployment recession gap,"de…ned as the unemployment rate minus the minimum value of the unemployment rate over the current and past 11 quarters. For standard gap measures, however, stability of the slope coe¢ cient is generally rejected. In contrast to these authors, we do not treat expected in ‡ation as pre-determined in our regressions. Instead, we estimate the Kalman gain and the NKPC slope parameter simultaneously using standard gap measures.
In recent work, Ball and Mazumder (2019a,b) argue that in ‡ation puzzles in the U.S.
and the euro area can be partially resolved by replacing standard measures of core in ‡ation with the weighted-median of industry in ‡ation rates-a measure that is less volatile than conventional core measures. In contrast, our speci…cation of agents' in ‡ation expectations resolves both in ‡ation puzzles when we use core CPI in ‡ation.
Our paper is also related to the literature on time-varying trend in ‡ation (Ascari and Sbordone 2014) . Cogley and Sbordone (2008) derive a version of the NKPC that explicitly allows for variations in trend in ‡ation. In their model, a time-varying vector autoregression is used to both construct a measure of trend in ‡ation and to represent agents' subjective beliefs. Under these assumptions, the inclusion of ad-hoc in ‡ation lags in the NKPC (the so-called "hybrid"NKPC) is no longer necessary to match in ‡ation persistence in U.S. data.
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In our model, agents'subjective beliefs about the time series process for in ‡ation introduces endogenous persistence that can match the data without the need for ad-hoc in ‡ation lags.
The remaining sections of the paper proceed as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y illustrates the "puzzling" in ‡ation dynamics implied by versions of the NKPC with either rational or backward-looking expectations. Section 3 presents our model of in ‡ation expectations that formalizes the idea of anchoring in terms of the Kalman gain parameter. Section 4 investigates the empirical implications of our model for the estimated slope coe¢ cient in the NKPC and for out-of-sample forecasts both during and after the Great Recession. Section 5 uses a simple New Keynesian equilibrium model to examine the theoretical links between the mon-etary policy rule coe¢ cients and the degree of anchoring in agents'expectations. Section 6 concludes.
In ‡ation Puzzles in Standard Models
The starting point for our analysis is the standard NKPC:
where t is the quarterly in ‡ation rate (log di¤erence of the price level), y t is the output gap (the log deviation of real output from potential output), u t is an iid cost-push shock, and is the representative agent's subjective time discount factor. The symbol e E t represents the agent's subjective expectations operator. Under rational expectations (RE), e E t becomes the mathematical expectation operator E t . Equation (1) can be derived from the sticky price model of Calvo (1983) or the menu cost model of Rotemberg (1982) .
For illustration purposes in this section, we complete the model using a simple autoregressive process for the output gap:
The h-quarter ahead rational in ‡ation forecast is given by
which implies that expected in ‡ation at any horizon h is perfectly correlated with the current output gap y t .
In contrast with equation (3), a backward-looking (BL) Phillips curve would typically assume that the agent's in ‡ation forecast is constructed as a distributed lag of past in ‡ation rates, with the lag coe¢ cients summing to unity. For example, Ball and Mazumder (2011) develop a model where expected in ‡ation is given by
For the following exercise, we substitute either the rational forecast (3) or the backwardlooking forecast (4) into the NKPC to construct a projected in ‡ation path from 2007 to 6 None of our conclusions depend on this assumption. In ‡ation puzzles also arise in fully speci…ed New Keynesian models with a zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate (see, for example, Auroba and Schorfheide 2016).
2019, conditional on the observed path for the CBO output gap. We set the discount factor to = 0:995, corresponding to an annual real interest rate of 2 percent. We estimate the autoregressive parameter of = 0:95 using data for the CBO output gap from 1984.q1 to 2007.q3. To be conservative, we set = 0:04 which is somewhat lower than values typically employed in the literature.
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Using the CBO output gap plotted in Figure 1 as a driving variable, we construct paths for in ‡ation and expected in ‡ation for the period 2007.q4 to 2019.q2 using each of the two forecast rules (3) or (4). In the case of the rational forecast, we add a constant term to the right side of equation (1) to bring the level of t up to the value observed in the data prior to the start of the exercise. The predictions of both models can be improved by employing an extremely low (near-zero) value of the slope parameter . Nevertheless, both models still fail to qualitatively match the patterns observed in the data.
A Model of In ‡ation Expectations
The NKPC (1) is derived under the assumption of a constant (zero) steady state in ‡ation rate. In reality, however, trend in ‡ation is positive and time-varying. Ascari (2004) and Sahuc (2006) demonstrate that the functional form of the NKPC changes under positive (and potentially time-varying) trend in ‡ation. However, Cogley and Sbordone (2008) show that a standard NKPC expression can be derived under subjective expectations and time-varying trend in ‡ation in terms of the in ‡ation gap (the deviation of in ‡ation from trend in ‡ation) 7 For example Aruoba and Schorfheide (2016) estimate ' 0:10 on U.S. data using Bayesian methods. In Gali (2008) , ' 0:13 (chapter 3). 8 The constant term corresponds to an annualized in ‡ation rate of 2.3%. This value also roughly coincides with pre-recession forecasts of long-run headline CPI in ‡ation from the SPF and Livingston surveys, but adjusted downward by 20 bp to account for the persistent gap between headline and core CPI in ‡ation prior to the recession. Notes: Model-implied in ‡ation and expected in ‡ation paths are expressed as annualized quarterly rates. In the right panel, "RE 10-y" is the rational expectation of the average quarterly in ‡ation rate over the next 40 quarters from equation (3), whereas "BL" is the 1-quarter ahead backward-looking forecast from equation (4). "SPF 10-y" is 10-year ahead headline CPI in ‡ation forecasts from the SPF, but adjusted downward by 20 bp to account for the persistent gap between headline and core CPI in ‡ation prior to the recession.
if non-resetting …rms index their price to past prices and/or to current trend in ‡ation. 9 The derivation of equation (1) also makes use of the Law of Iterated Expectations, which may not be satis…ed under subjective expectations. However, Adam and Padula (2011) show that if agents are unable to predict revisions to their own or other agents'forecasts, then subjective expectations will satisfy the Law of Iterated Expectations, thereby recovering a Phillips curve that resembles equation (1). Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2017) show that SPF in ‡ation forecasts do in fact appear to satisfy the Law of Iterated Expectations. As we will show, our model of subjective expectations closely tracks long-run in ‡ation expectations from the SPF.
If agents have imperfect knowledge about the underlying in ‡ation process and/or policymakers'objective function, then they must make statistical inferences about the evolution of the unobservable in ‡ation trend. Numerous studies show that in ‡ation or expected in ‡ation appears to be well-described by simple univariate time series models. According to Stock and Watson (2010) , "it is exceedingly di¢ cult to improve systematically upon simple univariate forecasting models [of in ‡ation]." Along the lines of Stock and Watson (2007, 2010) , we assume that agents employ the following time series model for in ‡ation:
where t is the unobservable in ‡ation trend, t is a transitory shock that pushes t away from trend, and t is permanent shock (uncorrelated with t ) that shifts the trend over time. But in contrast to Stock and Watson (2007, 2010) , we assume that agents abstract from stochastic volatility in the two types of shocks. Given the time series model (5), the optimal subjective forecast e E t t+1 is the Kalman …lter estimate of the unobserved in ‡ation trend t , as given by e E t t+1 = e E t t = t + (1 ) e E t 1 t ;
where 2 (0; 1] is the Kalman gain parameter which depends on the relative variances of the two types of shocks (Muth 1960 ). Equation (6) implies that the agent's subjective in ‡ation forecast at time t is an exponentially-weighted moving average of current and past in ‡ation rates.
A large body of empirical evidence suggests that moving-average type forecast rules, such
as (6) Adam, et al. 2017) , economists'long-run productivity growth forecasts (Edge, et al. 2011), in ‡ation forecasts of households and professionals (Mankiw, et al. 2003 , Lansing 2009 , Kozicki and Tinsley 2012 , Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2015b , and forecasts of other key macroeconomic variables Gorodnichenko 2012, Bordalo, et al. 2018) . In a prominent paper, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015b) show that ex-post mean in ‡ation forecast errors from the SPF can be predicted using ex-ante mean forecast revisions, consistent with a forecast rule of the form (6).
The optimal value of minimizes the one-step ahead mean squared forecast error, as
given by E( t+1 e E t t+1 ) 2 . It can be shown that the unique steady state solution for the optimal Kalman gain is given by
where 2 = 2 is the perceived signal-to-noise ratio for in ‡ation. 10 As can be seen from equation (6), governs the sensitivity of forecast revisions to in ‡ation surprises. The value of can therefore be viewed as measuring the degree to which in ‡ation expectations remain anchored, with a lower value implying more anchoring. As ! 1, we have
Intuitively, a high signal-to-noise ratio implies that in ‡ation is driven mostly by the permanent shock t . Consequently, agents are quick to revise their estimate of trend in ‡ation in response to incoming data, implying that expectations are poorly anchored. In contrast, a low signalto-noise ratio implies that in ‡ation is driven mostly by the transitory shock t . As ! 0,
we have ! 0: In this special case, agents do not revise their forecasts at all in response to recent forecast errors, implying that expectations are perfectly-anchored at the long-run mean in ‡ation rate. Along these lines, Lansing (2009) notes that the perceived signal-to-noise ratio can be viewed as an inverse measure of the central bank's credibility for maintaining a stable in ‡ation target.
We now consider whether an agent's perceived-optimal value of computed from U.S.
in ‡ation data has changed over time. Table 1 shows the values of that minimize the 1-quarter ahead mean squared forecast errors for quarterly core CPI in ‡ation rates across three subsamples. Speci…cally, we compute the value of that solves:
where t is the observed quarterly in ‡ation rate, h is the number of forecast errors in the subsample, and e E t k 1 t k is constructed using equation (6). Table 1 shows that the perceivedoptimal value of has declined substantially from around 0.5 in the Great In ‡ation Era to near-zero in the Great Recession Era. This pattern is driven by a decline in the in ‡ation signal-to-noise ratio. Put another way, unexpected changes in core CPI in ‡ation are much less persistent today than in earlier decades. Consequently, in ‡ation expectations, as governed by (6) 
The Flatter Phillips Curve
We now examine how a trend toward more-anchored in ‡ation expectations, i.e., a lower value of ; in ‡uences the estimated value of ; which represents the structural slope parameter of the NKPC. Substituting the agent's subjective in ‡ation forecast (6) into the NKPC (1) and then solving for t yields
Equation (9) implies the following partial derivative of in ‡ation with respect to the output gap:
The above derivative can be viewed measuring the slope of a reduced-form Phillips curve that is constructed by regressing t on a constant and y t : Lower values of , implying moreanchored in ‡ation expectations, serve to " ‡atten"the reduced-form Phillips curve even if the true NKPC slope parameter remains unchanged.
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Has the value of changed over time? To answer this question, we use equation (9) to simultaneously estimate and . Speci…cally, we run the following regression
where " t is an error term and e E t 1 t evolves according to the following law of motion:
For the …rst period to be forecasted, t = t 0 , we assume that the value of e E t 0 2 t 0 1 in equation (12) is exogenously given by the average of the eight most recent in ‡ation rates, i.e., 0:125 P 9 k=2 t 0 k . Our estimation procedure implies that the agent's forecast of in ‡ation at any time t makes use of all current and past in ‡ation rates observed within a given sample period. We estimate the system (11) and (12) using nonlinear least squares under the assumption that = 0:995.
12 We use quarterly data for core CPI in ‡ation and the CBO output gap 11 Lower values of also imply that t becomes less sensitive to the cost-push shock u t ; e.g., a shock to food or energy prices. This prediction of our model is consistent with U.S. data (Bernanke 2007 , Mishkin 2007 , Hooker 2012 . 12 In the New Keynesian literature, the NKPC is typically estimated with instrumental variables using lagged variables as instruments which should be orthogonal to the current period cost-push shock. However, as discussed by Mavroeidis, et al. (2014) , if cost-push shocks exhibit autocorrelation, then shocks will still be correlated with the lagged variables and the exclusion restriction will not be satis…ed. Our use of core in ‡ation helps to control for the direct impacts of cost-push shocks on in ‡ation. over the period 1960.q1 to 2019.q2. As in Table 1 , we split the data into three subsamples.
The estimation results are shown in Table 2 . Notes: The asterisks *** and ** denote signi…cance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. The estimation uses quarterly in ‡ation rates (not annualized). Newey-West standard errors (3 lags) are shown in parentheses. Table 2 shows that the estimated value of the NKPC slope parameter b remains relatively stable and highly statistically signi…cant across all three subsamples. In contrast, the estimated value of the Kalman gain parameter b declines over time, going from a value around 0.4 during the Great In ‡ation Era to around 0.2 during the Great Moderation Era. During the Great Recession Era, the estimated value of is not statistically di¤erent from zero, implying that in ‡ation expectations have been well-anchored during and after the Great Recession. If we …x the value of in our regressions to say = 0:25, then we obtain the usual result that b declines over time and eventually becomes statistically insigni…cant. In Table 2A of the appendix, we demonstrate that our results are robust to changes in both the in ‡ation measure (use of core PCE in ‡ation instead of core CPI in ‡ation) and the measure of economic slack (use of the unemployment gap instead of the output gap).
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The top panel of Figure 4 plots values of b from a series of 10-year rolling regressions.
14 The estimated value of the Kalman gain increases during the 1960s and 1970s, but then starts to decline in the early 1980s. This downward trend continues until the late 1990s. But since then, b remains roughly constant at a low positive value. These results indicate that the expectations anchoring process was completed roughly 20 years ago. Mishkin (2007) and 13 As shown in Table 2A , we do observe a decline in the magnitude of b for the unemployment gap when going from the Great In ‡ation Era to the Great Moderation Era. But then b remains roughly constant after this initial decline.
14 The initial condition e E t0 2 t0 1 for each rolling regression is the model-implied trend estimate for that quarter from the preceeding rolling regression. Bernanke (2007) . We set u t = 0 for all t and choose an initial value for e E t 1 t that corresponds to an annual in ‡ation rate of 2.3%. We employ three di¤erent values of ; corresponding to the three subsample point estimates shown earlier in Table 2 . To make the simulations comparable, we use our baseline value = 0:04 in all three cases, which roughly corresponds to the point estimates for the Great In ‡ation and Great Recession subsamples in Table 2 . Notes: Gray areas represent 95 percent con…dence intervals on point estimates from 10-year rolling regressions. Model-implied in ‡ation expectations are expressed as annualized quarterly rates. Long-run expectations in the data is the 10-year ahead forecast of headline CPI in ‡ation from the SPF, but adjusted downward by 20 bp to account for the persistent gap between headline and core CPI in ‡ation prior to the recession. 
Out-of-Sample Forecasts: Resolving the In ‡ation Puzzles
In this section, we show that the estimated version of our NKPC given by equations (11) and (12) can account for the "puzzling" behavior of in ‡ation since 2007. We estimate equations (11) and (12) Table 2 .
The out-of-sample in ‡ation forecasts from this exercise are plotted in Figure 7 . The modelimplied paths for in ‡ation and long-run expected in ‡ation track well with the corresponding series in the data. As noted earlier in the context of equation (10), a low value of ; implying well-anchored in ‡ation expectations, reduces the sensitivity of in ‡ation to movements in the output gap. According to our model, there is no missing disin ‡ation in the wake of the Great Recession. However, because in ‡ation expectations are not perfectly anchored, i.e.
> 0, the model-implied path for long-run expected in ‡ation will gradually decline when in ‡ation remains persistently low, as it does in the data. While the decline in long-run expected in ‡ation is modest (around 40 bp in the model and 25 bp in the SPF), it is highly persistent.
The low level of expected in ‡ation in the model serves to keep actual in ‡ation low, even after the output gap has fully recovered. Thus, according to the model, there is no missing in ‡ation in the years since the Great Recession ended.
16 As in Figure 4 , the initial condition e E t0 2 t0 1 is given by the trend estimate for that quarter from the preceeding rolling regression (ending in 2007.q2), which corresponds to an annualized in ‡ation rate close to 2.3% 17 Using 2019.q2 as the ending date instead of 2007.q3 increases the statistical power of these regressions without changing the qualitative conclusions. Notes: Gray areas indicate 95 percent con…dence bands. Model-implied in ‡ation and expected in ‡ation are expressed as annualized quarterly rates. Long-run expectations in the data is the 10-year ahead forecast of headline CPI in ‡ation from the SPF, but adjusted downward by 20 bp to account for the persistent gap between headline and core CPI in ‡a-tion prior to the recession.
Policy and Anchored Expectations in Equilibrium
What accounts for the anchoring of U.S. in ‡ation expectations, as re ‡ected by the decline is the estimated value of ? Many economists believe that the start of the anchoring phenomenon can be traced to a shift in monetary policy under Fed Chairman Paul Volcker in the early-1980s. Indeed, at the peak of the Great In ‡ation, Volcker himself (1979, pp. 888-889) emphasized the importance of in ‡ation expectations: "In ‡ation feeds in part on itself, so part of the job of returning to a more stable and more productive economy must be to break the grip of in ‡ationary expectations." In this section, we show that a more "hawkish" monetary policy can indeed serve to anchor the agent's subjective in ‡ation expectations in a simple New Keynesian model.
New Keynesian equilibrium model
We employ a three-equation New Keynesian model along the lines of Clarida, et al. (2000) consisting of the NKPC (1), an IS curve, and a monetary policy rule. The IS curve (which is derived from the agent's consumption Euler equation) is given by:
where i t is the deviation of the nominal policy interest rate from its steady state value, is the inverse of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, and v t is an iid demand shock that is uncorrelated with the cost-push shock.
Monetary policy is governed by a Taylor-type rule (Taylor 1993 ):
where and y determine the response of the policy interest rate to in ‡ation and the output gap. We assume that the Taylor principle is satis…ed such that > 1.
The model contains two subjective expectations, namely e E t t+1 and e E t y t+1 . As before, e E t t+1 is given by equation (6) which is the perceived-optimal forecast rule for t+1 conditional on the agent's time series model for in ‡ation (5). We postulate that the agent employs an analogous time series model for the output gap which is given by:
where y t is the perceived long-run output gap, t is a transitory shock and ' t is permanent shock (uncorrelated with t ). A technical point worth noting is that while the CBO output gap appears to be stationary, it is highly persistent. For example, the CBO output gap remained in negative territory for nearly a decade from 2008.q1 through 2017.q3. The autoregressive coe¢ cient in quarterly data from 1984.q1 to 2019.q2. is 0.95. The agent's use of a time series model that exhibits a unit root can be viewed as a local approximation that is convenient for forecasting purposes.
Conditional on the agent's time series model for the output gap (15), the perceived-optimal forecast rule for y t+1 is given by e E t y t+1 = e E t y t = y y t + (1 y ) e E t 1 y t ;
where y 2 (0; 1] is the optimal Kalman gain. Analogous to equation (7), the solution for y
where y 2 ' = 2 is the perceived signal-to-noise ratio for the output gap. Our model speci…cation is consistent with the …ndings of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015b) who identify di¤erent degrees of information rigidity across macroeconomic variables, implying the use of di¤erent Kalman gains when professionals forecast these variables.
Consistent Expectations Equilibrium
Rational expectations are sometimes called "model consistent expectations." A more precise term would be "true-model consistent expectations," because the maintained assumption is that agents know the true model of the economy. In reality, agents do not know the true model of the economy, but they can observe economic data. In this section, we solve for a "consistent expectations equilibrium" in which the parameters of the representative agent's subjective forecast rules are consistent with: (1) the perceived laws of motion for t and y t ;
and (2) the observed moments of t and y t in the model-generated data.
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Proposition 1. If the representative agent's perceived law of motion for in ‡ation is given by equation (5), then the perceived optimal value of the Kalman gain parameter is uniquely pinned down by the autocorrelation of observed in ‡ation changes, Corr ( t ; t 1 ).
Proof : From (5), we have t = t + t t 1 : Since t and t are perceived to be independent, we have Cov ( t ; t 1 ) = 2 and V ar ( t ) = 2 +2 2 : Combining these two expressions and solving for the signal-to-noise ratio yields
where 2 = 2 and Corr ( t ; t 1 ) = Cov ( t ; t 1 ) =V ar ( t ) :
The above expression shows that Corr ( t ; t 1 ) uniquely pins down . The value of , in turn, uniquely pins down from equation (7). From the agent's perspective, the shocks t and Proposition 1 shows that the observed data statistic Corr ( t ; t 1 ) is used to pin down the value of which, in turn, governs the weights assigned to past rates of in ‡ation in the agent's subjective forecast rule (6). This result is reminiscent of the "accelerationist controversy" identi…ed by Sargent (1971, p. 35) who argued persuasively that any forecast weighting scheme involving past rates of in ‡ation should "be compatible with the observed evolution of the rate of in ‡ation."
Analogous to equation (18), the perceived signal-to-noise ratio for the output gap y is uniquely pinned down by the observed data statistic Corr ( y t ; y t 1 ) : The value of y , in turn, uniquely pins down y from equation (17).
Given the values of , y , ; and y together with the agent's perceived-optimal forecast rules (6) and (16), the actual law of motion (ALM) for the economy is governed by the three model equations (1), (13), and (14). The ALM can written in the following matrix form:
where Z t h t y t i t e E t t+1 e E t y t+1 i 0 and U t u t v t 0 . The variance-covariance matrix V of the left-side variables in equation (19) can be computed using the formula:
where is the variance-covariance matrix of the two fundamental shocks u t and v t . Given the moments of t and y t from equation (20) 
and where the statistics Corr ( t ; t 1 ) and Corr ( y t ; y t 1 ) are computed from the actual law of motion (19).
To obtain a graphical representation of the equilibrium, it is useful to express the nonlinear maps (21) and (22) 
A consistent expectations equilibrium must therefore satisfy the following two conditions:
If only one pair ( ; y ) satis…es both (25) and (26) with and y as de…ned in (21) and (22), then the equilibrium is unique.
Numerical Solution for the Equilibrium
The complexity of the equilibrium conditions (25) and (26) necessitates a numerical solution for the equilibrium. We consider a textbook calibration of the New Keynesian model using the parameter values shown in Table 3 . As in previous sections, we set = 0:995 and = 0:04. We employ a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (1= ) equal to 2, a typical value. The coe¢ cients in the Taylor-type rule are = 1:5 and y = 0:5=4 (Taylor 1999 , Gali 2008 . The standard deviations of the shocks, u = v = 0:2, are chosen to roughly match the observed volatility of core CPI in ‡ation and the CBO output gap in the Great Moderation Era. Figure 8 plots the equilibrium conditions (25) and (26) Policy rule response to in ‡ation. 19 Although not plotted here, we have veri…ed that the model's consistent expectations equilibrium is convergent under a real time learning algorithm in which the agent's estimates of the population statistics Corr (4 t ; 4 t 1 ) and Corr (4y t ; 4y t 1 ) are computed using past data generated by the model itself. Details are available upon request.
Monetary Policy Regime Change
A large literature has identi…ed shifts in the conduct of U.S. monetary policy starting with the Volcker disin ‡ation of the early 1980s (Clarida, et al. 2000 , Orphanides 2004 ). Other research has documented a substantial decrease in U.S. macroeconomic volatility starting roughly around the same time (McConnell and Perez-Quirós 2000) . In this section, we examine the implications of a shift towards a more hawkish monetary policy in the context of our New Keynesian consistent expectations model. First, we compute the …xed point values of and y for di¤erent combinations of the policy rule coe¢ cients and y : All other parameters take on the values shown in Table 3 . The results of the exercise are plotted in Figure 9 .
The left panel of Figure 9 shows that, all else equal, a stronger monetary response to in ‡ation (higher coe¢ cient) reduces the equilibrium value of ; thereby serving to endogenously anchor the agent's in ‡ation expectations. Intuitively, the anchoring occurs because higher values of serve to push the statistic Corr (4 t ; 4 t 1 ) further into negative territory, implying a faster reversion of in ‡ation to steady state in response to a shock. The right panel of Figure 9 shows that, all else equal, a stronger monetary response to the output gap (higher y coe¢ cient) also reduces the equilibrium value of : In this case, the stronger response to the output gap works via the NKPC slope parameter to once again bring about a faster reversion of in ‡ation to steady state.
We now consider whether plausible shifts in the policy rule coe¢ cients and shock volatilities can simultaneously explain both the anchoring of U.S. in ‡ation expectations and the decline in U.S. macroeconomic volatility observed over the past several decades. Speci…cally, we solve for the values of , y , u and v that enable our model to approximately match the standard deviations of in ‡ation, the output gap and the federal funds rate, as well as the statistic Corr (4 t ; 4 t 1 ), in two di¤erent subsamples of U.S. data. Again, all other parameters take on the values shown in Table 3 . The results of this exercise are shown in Table 4 . The + superscripts indicate the moments in the data that we aim to match.
For the model to reproduce the high macroeconomic volatility of the Great In ‡ation Era, the policy rule coe¢ cients must be very low. The model-implied values of = 1:11 and y = 0 would place the rational expectations version of the model near the threshold of equilibrium indeterminacy. Whether or not the U.S. economy was in a state of equilibrium indeterminacy in the pre-Volcker era remains unsettled (Clarida, et al. 2000 , Orphanides 2004 ). Table 4 shows that a transition to a more hawkish monetary policy regime serves to endogenously anchor the agent's subjective in ‡ation expectations as the model-implied value of declines from 0.46 to 0.34. A notable feature of our model is that it can account for most of the persistence of t and y t observed in the U.S. data without relying on other devices (e.g., consumption habits, ad-hoc in ‡ation lags in the NKPC, or highly persistent shocks) that are typically required in RE models (Smets and Wouters 2003) . Importantly, Table 4 shows that the shift to a more hawkish monetary policy enables our model to reproduce another stylized fact of the Great Moderation, namely, a decline in in ‡ation persistence. Speci…cally, the model-implied value of Corr ( t ; t 1 ) goes from 0.67 in the Great In ‡ation Era to 0.40 in the Great Moderation Era.
According to the model, the standard deviation of the cost-push shock u decreases during the Great Moderation-in line with most accounts of the period. According to Blinder (1982) , oil and food price shocks, coupled with pent-up in ‡ation from the release of the Nixon wageprice controls in 1974, can account for most of the increase in in ‡ation during the 1970s.
Furthermore, he argues that the absence of these same factors can account for most of the decline in in ‡ation during the early 1980s.
The model-implied value of v (demand shock standard deviation) goes up during the Great Moderation. Typically, however, "good luck" explanations of the Great Moderation identify declines in the volatilities of both supply-and demand-side shocks during this period (Sims and Zha 2006) . Hence, our model implies that the observed decline in the volatility of the output gap is primarily due to improved monetary policy, as opposed to good luck. Note: The …gure shows that, all else equal, a stronger monetary response to in ‡ation (higher coe¢ cient) or a stronger monetary response to the output gap (higher y coe¢ cient) act to reduce the equilibrium value of ; thereby serving to endogenously anchor the agent's in ‡ation expectations. Table 3 . Standard deviations are expressed in percent. Data values are for core CPI in ‡ation, the CBO output gap and the federal funds rate. The data values for correspond to the estimates in Table 2 . The + superscripts indicate the moments in the data that we aim to match. Model statistics are computed analytically using equation (20) .
Conclusion
Standard versions of the New Keynesian Phillips curve cannot account for the "missing disin ‡ation"during the U.S. Great Recession and the "missing in ‡ation"during the subsequent recovery, leading many to believe that the Phillips curve relationship has weakened or even disappeared. In this paper, we formalize the idea of anchored in ‡ation expectations in the context of a model where agents forecast in ‡ation using a simple univariate time series process-along the lines of Stock and Watson (2007, 2010) . We show that the anchoring of in ‡ation expectations implied by our model can help explain the observed ‡attening of the reduced-form Phillips curve even while the true underlying slope parameter of the NKPC remains stable and statistically signi…cant. In an out-of-sample forecast from 2007 to 2019, we show that an estimated version of the NKPC can account for the dynamics of in ‡ation and long-run expected in ‡ation in U.S. data, thereby resolving the in ‡ation puzzles. Finally, we use a simple New Keynesian equilibrium model to show that a stronger monetary policy response to either in ‡ation or the output gap serves to endogenously anchor agents'subjective in ‡ation expectations, leading to lower macroeconomic volatility and reduced in ‡ation persistence.
A Appendix: Robustness of NKPC Estimates Table 2A shows the results of estimating equation (11) using two alternative speci…cations:
(1) t is measured by core PCE in ‡ation instead of core CPI in ‡ation, and (2) economic slack is measured by the unemployment gap instead of the CBO output gap. The point estimate of the NKPC slope parameter b increases slightly over time when we use core PCE in ‡ation. In contrast, the absolute value of b tends to decline over time when we use the unemployment gap. Taken together with our baseline results in Table 2 , the evidence supports the view that b has remained relatively stable and signi…cant over time. Notes: The asterisks ***/ **/* denote signi…cance at the 1/5/10 percent levels, respectively. Newey-West standard errors (3 lags) shown in parentheses. Due to limited data availability, the regression for the Great In ‡ation Era using Core PCE in ‡ation starts in 1961.q3.
